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IS PUBLIC INTERVENTION IN WATER
RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT CONDUCIVE
TO ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY?*
JOHN V. KRUTILLAt

The objective of this paper is to raise questions about matters
which many of us working in the water resources field have felt
to be settled. Some propositions in welfare economics which have
become firmly established in concept and practice are reviewed in
their historical context, and questions are raised regarding their
relevance and applicability at this stage in the development of water
resources in the United States, and whether or not their uncritical
application has created some mischief for the efficiency water resource programs achieve. Finally, attention is directed toward the
institutional mechanism through which public intervention seeks to
influence the decision regarding the extent and character of governmental resource development programs, and whether or not these
institutions are compatible at present with the efficiency objectives
that justify public intervention.
I
RECENT HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The effort devoted to developing decision rules for governmental
participation in the water resources field has a fairly long history.
The initial major contribution to this field has been the work of
personnel in the water resource agencies, the Bureau of the Budget
and the former Bureau of Agricultural Economics. In the academic
area notable contributions were made by Professor Ciriacy-Wantrup
at the University of California, and by agricultural economists at
other land grant colleges. The framework of decision rules evolved
to some extent pragmatically and existed in fairly complete form
* This article was accepted by the Journal for publication on March 22, 1965.The Editors.
t Resources for the Future, Inc., Washington, D.C.
This paper is an extension of remarks made at a seminar for economists of the
Corps of Engineers, sponsored by the Office of the Chief of Engineers, January, 1964.
I am indebted to Bob Davis, Irving Fox, Orris Herfindahl, Allen Kneese, Jack
Knetsch, and Vincent Ostrom for helpful comments made on a previous draft.
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in the Green Book.1 However, in the middle 1950's, the field was
discovered by other economists as well, and the flow of literature
was notably increased.
There were two events, one policy and the other political, which
probably accounted for the increased interest in the field. The first
was the Treasury-Federal Reserve Accord in 1951, which liberated
the latter from its obligation, assumed during World War II, to
support the price of government securities, thus returning to the
Federal Reserve System its traditional function of seeing that interest rates performed more nearly their economic role in the economy. The second was a change in national administrations which resulted in there being exhibited in Washington a marked preference
for having more of the nation's economic functions carried -out by
the private sector.
The change in administrations accompanied by a tendency to
withdraw government participation in the economic sector induced
economists to some extent to address more specifically than before
the justification for public intervention in the water resouirces field.
The tenents of applicable welfare economics, which first appeared
in developed form in the work of Pigou,2 had become submerged
in the details of controversy over the "New Welfare Economics,"
and a modern restatement and rehabilitation appeared to be necessary. To a certain extent this was done, albeit inadvertently, by
Professor Baumol 3 in his incisive monograph, Welfare Economics
and the Theory of the State. Nevertheless, despite the excellence
of the work and the stimulus it provided for some who contributed
to the subject in the water field, Baumol's effort was dominated by
a rather narrow consideration of exposing the fruitlessness of welfare economics as it was characterized by discussion during the
decades of the thirties and forties. While he presented the most
comprehensive statement for governmental intervention, he did not
appear to regard it essentially as a restatement of the venerable
Pigouvian thesis. Essentially Baumol's effort was a critique of the
application of the classical model in analysis of real world problems in significant areas. It was a constructive piece of demolition
work, but so far as the rehabilitation of Pigou was concerned, it
1. Sub-Comm. on Benefits and Costs, Report to the Federal Inter-Agency River
Basin Comm., Proposed Practices for Economic Analysis of River Basin Projects
(1950) [hereinafter cited as Green Book].
2. A. C. Pigou, The Economics of Welfare (4th ed., MacMillan 1952).
3. W. J. Baumol, Welfare Economics and the Theory of the State (Harvard Univ.
Press 1952).
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left the matter at approximately the point where Pigou had begun
forty years previously.
Several related, though independent, efforts were undertaken during the mid-fifties directed toward an attempt to develop the economic rationale for public intervention. At the most general level
was the work of Paul Samuelson, 4 which was an extension of some
of the earlier work of Howard Bowen,5 and which was pursued
further by Musgrave. 8 Julius Margolis, 7 among others, cultivated
the area in the water resources field, and I believe somewhat innocent of the excellent statement by Earl Heady."
The argument, irrespective of its particular formulation, goes
somewhat as follows. In an economy characterized by competitive
conditions, and in the absence of certain technical conditions in some
restricted areas, i.e., complete divisibility of inputs and outputs,
and allied independence of production (and consumption) functions,
free market results will fail accurately to reflect the social worth
of inputs and outputs through the intermediary of prices. Where
indivisibilities in production occur, resulting in the least cost scale
of output being large in relation to the market, decreasing cost
industries occur. In these instances pricing of output at marginal
costs will not recover full costs and thus poses problems for efficiency under private management. On the consumption side, indivisibilities associated with outputs (e.g., flood damage by means
of regulated discharge from storage reservoirs) means that the
product or service cannot be discreetly packaged and offered
separately to each individual subject to payment of a price. Accordingly, a conventional market cannot be organized. Where production functions are physically interdependent, external economies and
diseconomies arise causing divergences between private and social
marginal product and cost. In the resources field, the prevalence of
such conditions makes it clear that were resource development restricted exclusively to the private sector, there would result fairly
widespread inefficiencies. Accordingly, public intervention could be
4. P. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 Rev. Econ. & Statistics 387 (1954).
5. H. R. Bowen, Toward Social Economy (Rinehardt 1948).
6. R. A. Musgrave, The Theory of Public Finance: A Study in Public Economy
(McGraw-Hill 1959).
7. J. Margolis, Secondary Benefits, External Economies and the Justification of
Public Investment, 39 Rev. Econ. & Statistics 347 (1957).
8. E. 0. Heady, Economics of Agricultural Production and Use, ch. 26 (PrenticeHall 1952).
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demonstrated to be a necessary condition for the improvement of
efficiency.
In this connection, perhaps not enough explicit attention was paid
the fact that while public intervention was necessary, it need not be
sufficient for improvement in efficiency. For intervention to be also
a sufficient condition for improvement in efficiency, appropriate
criteria must be developed and, assuming in the final analysis that
there is a feasible way to do so, applied with sufficient fidelity to
ensure that the objectives of public intervention in the interests of
efficiency are reasonably approximated. This, of course, has been
the ostensible purpose of benefit-cost analysis and the standards
for its application.
II
THE SUBSIDY IN PUBLIC CAPITAL

It is perhaps well at this point to consider the circumstances
given rise by the Treasury-Federal Reserve Accord. As a backdrop,
it is interesting that benefit-cost analysis had its inception in the field
of water resource development in the United States during the
1930's when widespread unemployment was being experienced. Yet
the basic model from which decision rules were derived was the
classical full employment model reflecting conditions wherein prices
have a unique significance. The fact that it had any utility, and it
did, was because only a nominal interest rate was imputed and
because fairly extensive claims to secondary and/or indirect benefits
were incorporated. This is not meant to imply that the reasoning
underlying secondary benefit estimation was conceptually sound, but
this was before the theories of Keynes and related developments
had percolated to the general practitioner.
Following World War II, however, the existence of inflationary
pressures made it abundantly clear that the Federal Reserve System
should be liberated from its obligation to support the price of
Treasury bonds, which in turn resulted in a substantial rise in the
interest rate with time. To the extent that these rates reflect the
marginal return to capital in the sectors from which it is withdrawn
in funding public works, the rise in the rate of interest needs to be
reflected fully in the benefit-cost calculations dealing with public
investment. That is to say, if economic efficiency is to be achieved
by governmental intervention, the marginal efficiency of investment
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must be equated between the private sector supplying funds and the
public sector utilizing them. If it is not, then while intervention may
remain a necessary condition, it need not be sufficient. In that event
the justification for public intervention must be judged by the relative degree of inefficiency under private as compared with public
development.
What may be the quantitative significance of the preceding observations? Although interest rates rose considerably following the
Treasury-Federal Reserve Accord, the rates used in federal water
resource project evaluation were slow to respond. Initially, in 1952,
the Bureau of the Budget requested of agencies that projects submitted for authorization employ a standard rate computed on the
basis of the average rate of interest payable by the Treasury on
outstanding long-term government bonds.9 Budget Bureau Circular
A-47, containing the standard, had a rather ambiguous existence,
and not until 1962 and Senate Document 9710 was the standard
made mandatory on all agencies participating in water resources
development.
It should be observed that the interest rate referred to above
was the coupon rate on bonds of long maturities rather than current
yields. Accordingly, the rate continued to be determined in part by
the level of rates prevailing before the Treasury-Federal Reserve
Accord, and thus reflects in part the persistent influence of the artificially depressed rates. Table 1 gives the trend on actual yields of
long-term government securities and the computed rates for project
evaluation purposes based upon the average of the coupon rates.
Such differences are sufficient to alter the benefit-cost ratio to less
than unity of projects in the 1.0:1 to 1.2:1 range, of which there
have been quite a number. If, on the other hand, one takes as more
pertinent the rates which a government corporation engaged in
self-financing projects, such as the TVA, has had to meet in its bond
issues (averaging around 4.5 per cent), the divergence between the
computed and the actual rates results in larger discrepancies in project evaluation studies. In the extreme the benefit-cost calculation
may overstate benefits by thirty to forty per cent.
9. Hearings Before the House Committee
cussion of Budget Bureau Circular A1-47 and
84th Cong., 1st Sess. 54 (1955).
10. Policies, Standards and Procedures in
of Plans for Use and Development of Water
97, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962).

on the Interior and Insular Affairs: Disthe Related Power Partnership Principle,
the Formulation, Evaluation and Review
and Related Land Resources, S. Doc. No.
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These discrepancies relate only to the differences between the
computed rate and the yields on long term government bonds. Students of the problem, on the other hand, have uniformly recommended rates which exceed the yield on government bonds, ranging
from five per cent up to nine per cent." Fox and Herfindahl1 have
TABLE 1
COMPARISON OF YIELDS OF GOVERNMENT LONG-TERM SECURITIES
AND COMPUTED COUPON RATES

Year

Current Yields
(Per Cent)

1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964

2.68
2.93
2.70
2.94
3.08
3.47
3.43
4.08
4.02
3.90
3.95
4.00
4.15

Computed Rates
(Per Cent)

2.50
2.50
2.50
2.50
2.50
2.50
2.50
2.50
2.50
2.625
2.625
2.875
3.00

recently reviewed the projects authorized by the Congress in 1962
for construction by the Corps of Engineers, applying alternatively
interest rates of 4, 6 and 8 per cent, and discovered that the percentage of these with benefit-cost ratios below unity under the assumed rates of interest were respectively 9, 64 and 80 per cent.
From these observations one can infer that artificially depressed
rates have been used to justify projects which may be either inherently uneconomic or at least undertaken prematurely. And, of
course, even with respect to projects which would show benefits in
excess of costs at the higher interest rates, the use of depressed
rates results in inefficiencies in the design of works, i.e., excessive
capital intensity and/or scale of facility.
11. 0. Eckstein, Water Resources Development (Harvard Univ. Press 1958)
J. Hirshleifer, J. C. DeHaven & J. W. Milliman, Water Supply: Economics, Technology
and Policy (Univ. of Chicago Press 1960).
12. I. K. Fox & 0. C. Herfindahl, Attainment of Efficiency in Satisfying Demands
for Water Resources, 54 Am. Econ. Rev. 198 (1964).
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III
THE FALLACY OF THE "EVALUATION-REIMBURSEMENT"
DICHOTOMY

A second area in which the sufficiency of public intervention for
improvement of economic efficiency may be questioned relates to
some issues which result as a rather special case, a fact which may
not be generally appreciated in water resource development planning. The problem in question involves the distinction which is
drawn between economic evaluation and reimbursement. The matter was first raised by the French engineer Dupuit 18 in the early
nineteenth century and resurrected by Harold Hotelling"4 in his
classic work on marginal cost pricing. The burden of the marginal
cost pricing thesis is that the context of the general economy, the
investment decision is independent of the reimbursement policy for
individual chunks of productive capacity. In a somewhat different
form, yet cut from the same cloth, is the Hicks-Kaldor thesis 5 in
modern welfare economics that decision with respect to economic
efficiency can be regarded as independent of the attendant income
distribution. That is to say, if beneficiaries from a change in the
state of affairs can compensate out of their gains those who are
affected adversely (e.g., project beneficiaries versus unbenefited taxpayers), whether they do or not is not critical to the change being
sufficient for improvement in productive efficiency. The income distribution which attends the change in circumstances is asserted to
be an ethical question without implications for efficiency. Again,
these postulates from welfare and related economic theory are reflected in the distinction which is made in water resource development practice between project justification and the reimbursement
policy.
For these postulates to be applicable in practice, one of two special circumstances is required. The first relates to the technical
conditions of production, and the second to the stage in the pro13. Reprinted with comments by Mario di Bernardi and Luigi Einaudi, De l'Utilite
et da sa Mesure, La Riforma Sociale, Turin, 1932.
14. H. Hotelling, The General Welfare in Relation to Problems of Taxation and of
Railway and Utility Rates, 6 Econometrica 242 (1938).
15. J. R. Hicks, Foundations of Welfare Economics, 49 Economic Journal 696 (1939),
and The Rehabilitation of Consumer Surplus, 12 Rev. Econ. Studies 549 (1940) ; N.
Kaldor, Welfare Propositions of Economics and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility,
49 Economic Journal 480 (1939).
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duction process in which the resource development project is intended to function.
With respect to the technical conditions of production, the minimum scale of development to achieve low costs per unit output
must be quite large in relation to the market so that the project
will operate with decreasing costs. This is the typical situation in
which marginal cost pricing presents a problem. Marginal cost
pricing is a general rule for efficient production and exchange, but
typically marginal costs exceed average costs so that pricing at
marginal costs will return full costs. In the case of decreasing cost
industries, marginal costs fall below average costs and thus full costs
cannot be recovered with such a pricing policy. Perhaps in this latter
case it should be said that when viewed realistically, not only should
the scale be large in relation to the market, but also that conditions
in the economy would need to be comparatively static so that excess
capacity would be anticipated as a relatively permanent feature
of the facility in question if a pricing policy consistent with full cost
recovery were adopted.
Of course, at the time of the Hotelling article there was excess
capacity throughout the economy. With depressed conditions, a
marked decline in the birthrate, and general economic stagnation,
there was widespread merit to pricing policies which were indifferent
to the recovery of full costs. On the other hand, while this is doubtless true under relatively static conditions, under conditions of vigorous economic expansion it no longer remains true that cost recovery is irrelevant for efficient resource use. For example, while
initially there may be unused capacity which warrants a marginal
cost pricing policy indifferent to the recovery of full costs, when
use begins to approach capacity an unemphasized extension of the
marginal cost pricing rule requires that prices be raised to ration
the scarce capacity until a point is reached at which the revenue
demonstrates a beneficiary willingness to pay for the service sufficient to justify an expansion of facilities. In the case of an inland
waterway, for example, marginal cost pricing suggests that user
fees be applied immediately sufficient to cover annual operating and
maintenance costs while excess capacity exists on the waterway.
However, as use of the waterway expands to the point where congestion begins to appear, each additional unit of use inflicts costs
associated with the congestion on all other users of the waterway.
In this sense a social cost occurs. This cost will rise progressively
until the congestion costs approach the cost of enlarging the capac-
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ity. If user fees are raised correspondingly, the user fee at this point
(corresponding to the marginal social cost) will be just equal to
the average cost of an increment of capacity. In short, the marginal
cost pricing under these conditions will result in exactly recovering
costs of facilities of optimal scale and schedule of expansion.1"
The only other circumstance in which a case can be advanced for
divorcing reimbursement policy from project evaluation involves
productive facilities which provide consumer goods under a special set of circumstances. In the case of consumer goods, welfare
propositions would suggest that such can be provided without regard to reimbursement, provided the undertaking is regarded primarily as a desirable income redistributive measure. 1 7 While there
may be some implications for efficiency even here, efficiency in this
case is a subordinate consideration.
On the other hand, while in principle a similar argument may be
advanced in the case of projects producing intermediate goods and
services destined for further use in the production process, there
seem to be enough problems associated with this case in practice
to raise doubts regarding their efficacy as income redistributive
measures as well as their consequences for efficiency. Income redistribution can be looked upon technically as relaxing the budget constraint of specific disadvantaged individuals or groups. Or, in some
cases, as making provision for some items, catering to what are referred to as "merit wants," to enter into the consumption patterns
of individuals whose incomes are inadequate for this purpose. Subsidization of producer goods and services via reimbursement policies,
on the other hand, has the effect of redistributing several stages
removed from the point of intended impact with the consequent
diffusion of redistributive effects among many individuals and groups
16. As a practical matter, of course, it is neither realistic nor desirable to have a
continuously varying price of unpredictable magnitude (although peak load pricing
of definite and known characteristics is another matter). The degree of uncertainty
attending unstable prices for project output would affect adversely the investment
environment for related industries. A practical alternative developed by Electricit6 de
France is a stable price or rate equal to the average cost of the incremental capacity
(incorporating where appropriate peak load pricing provisions) which results in recovering fully the cost of facilities at an optimal scale of capacity and/or expansion
schedule. See M. Boiteux, Marginal Cost Pricing, in Marginal Cost Pricing in Practice
51 (Nelson ed., Prentice-Hall 1964). This point has also been established by Herbert
Mohring, The Benefits of Urban Highway Investments, Paper Presented at the Brookings Institution Conference on Government Investment Expenditures, Washington, D.C.,
Nov. 1963.
17. That income redistribution is an implicit requirement is apparent since even here
there would otherwise be a distortion of the marginal conditions required for efficiency
in consumption.
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not qualified on welfare grounds. It resembles too much a scattergun approach in which only a small proportion of the shot-charge
ultimately hits the intended target.
On efficiency grounds the practice with respect to facilities providing producer goods and services has serious economic consequences. In the first instance, when services of water resource development projects are provided without cost, users of these factor
services consider them as zero priced and combine their productive
factors in proportions which reflect the "free" input. A greater use
of the services of the facility is made than real costs warrant. That
is, not only those who could compensate the development agency
(even if not required to do so) take advantage of the subsidized
service, but also other firms which would not find it profitable to
do so if they were required to meet the cost of the services they
employ. This will lead to premature excess demand, or congestion,
whatever the case in question may be, and political pressure for expansion of facilities to alleviate the ostensible capacity shortage.
There thus develops a systematic bias in favor of facilities to be of
greater capacity than economically justified and/or redeveloped or
expanded prematurely when built at public expense.
In addition to the inefficiency a systematic bias in favor of overexpansion introduces into the system, there appear inefficiencies
throughout the system in productive enterprise which utilizes the
publicly provided factor services. 8 That is, if materials and service
in process are obtained by related production units at below their
opportunity cost, there will be distortion in the marginal conditions
for efficient production by the relative over-utilization of materials
and services priced below cost and a relative over-allocation of
all factors devoted to the production of the end products for which
these subsidized services are utilized.
We may consider an example. Assume that there exists an option
between two alternative policies with respect to the incidence of
costs for a water quality management program. On the one hand,
the government may stand ready to supply at public expense releases of waste dilution flows from storage projects built for this
purpose. Alternatively, a policy might be adopted which involved
effluent charges on firms which discharge noxious substances into
the stream, depending on the quality and quantity of the effluent,
18. A similar argument has been elaborated for a somewhat different circumstance
by L. McKenzie, Ideal Output and the Interdependence of Firms, 41 The Economic
Journal 785 (1951).
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and its off site costs. In the first instance no incentive exists for firms
using the waste degradation capacity of the stream to restrict or
modify the character of their discharge. On the other hand, if use
of the waste degradation capacity of receiving waters is subject to
an effluent charge, incentives exist for reviewing the least cost program by each firm whether through process adjustment which eliminates some portion of the noxious substances, internal treatment
and waste recovery, or discharge into receiving waters unmodified
subject to a charge. In many instances the economics internal to the
firm when faced with effluent charges would commend adjusting to
the circumstances with a reduced discharge of offending substances.
Accordingly, if the cost of pursuing a water quality management
program were assumed by the beneficiaries, a substantially different
organization of productive factors would result. There is sufficient
evidence to this effect as provided by the German experience in
the Ruhr to warrant belief that reimbursement policies which do not
require beneficiaries to assume costs of project services lead to substantial inefficiency throughout related sectors of the economy."
Can we say something about the quantitative significance of these
observations? It is not possible within the scope of this paper to
attempt a precise measurements. But, quite short of such an effort,
it may be possible to provide at least the roughest sort of notion
as to what may be involved as an order of magnitude. The Deputy
Chief for Civil Works of the Corps of Engineers, testifying before
a congressional committee on water pollution and control had this
to say: 2
The Corps of Engineers has recently estimated that the programs
for which it has planning responsibility would be formulated to provide 320 million acre feet of reservoir storage capacity by 2 1980.
Much of that capacity will be needed for water quality control. '

This amount of pollution abatement storage represents nearly
double the total storage capacity developed to the present time in
the United States for all purposes combined. If we consider the
19. A. V. Kneese, The Economics of Regional Water Quality Management (Johns
Hopkins Press for Resources for the Future, Inc. 1964).
20. Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Go'vernmental

Operations on Water Pollution Control and Abatement, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 1244
(1964).
21. The water quality control and pollution abatement storage requirements for
the nation are put at 315 million acre-feet.
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conditions which exist on the Ruhr in Germany, on the other hand,
we have a vastly altered picture. Here, a region which supports
about forty per cent of all West German industrial activity and a
greater proportion of its heavy industry, is able to meet its urban
and industrial water uses and demand for aesthetically pleasing
recreation on an annually expected low flow of only 440 cubic feet
per second, little more than half of the lowest flow of record on the
Potomac River alone. If we were to assume the same water quality
management organization and technology in operation in the United
States as currently exists in the Ruhr, the industrial output of the
entire United States projected for 1980 could be adequately serviced
by the stream flows of the Columbia River alone during its most
adverse flow of record without benefit of any storage. This is not
to claim that conditions in the United States are identical, nor
that an exact replication of Ruhr technology would represent the
most economical means of achieving the desired water quality in
the United States. But between no additional storage for water
quality management purposes and the estimated 315 million additional acres cited above there exists an enormous latitude for
evolving a discriminating program of cost reducing technology
for water quality management. Appropriate effluent charges would
provide a powerful inducement to seek that program representing
the most efficient way to deal with water quality problems.
There is one additional problem which arises as a consequence
of the separation of project justification from reimbursement considerations. Typically, both theory and practice in water resource
system design abstracts from the reimbursement question and seeks
to address only the question whether or not the project is justified on
the basis of efficiency criteria irrespective of pricing policy governing
the output.21 A project is to be included in the efficient program if
its total benefits exceed its total cost. The project scale is determined
by equating incremental benefits to incremental costs, i.e., where the
net benefit is maximized. 2 However, if the pricing policy governing
output is not taken into consideration explicitly there is a dilemma
which almost everyone involved in proposing investment criteria
22. An example of this is provided in Maass et al., The Design of Water Resource Systems 38-40 (Harvard Univ. Press 1962). While I am not certain that
Hirshleifer, DeHaven and Milliman address this question explicitly, their implicit position would not be subject to the critique developed herein. See Hirshleifer et al., op. cit.
supra note 11.
23. Green Book 12; 0. Eckstein, Water Resources Development 65 passim (Harvard
Univ. Press 1958).
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for water resource development has failed to face up to directly.2 4
This problem arises in connection with determining the scale of a
facility when it is anticipated that no charge will be levied against
beneficiaries. We have on the one hand the dicta that the scale of a
facility be extended to the point at which the incremental benefit
just equals the incremental cost. However, unless user charges are
levied such as to cover the cost of providing the marginal unit of
output, there will develop excess demand represented by those users
who would not find incentive to use the services of the facility if
charges appropriate to the design criteria were imposed, but who
will make use of the facility because the service is provided at zero
price. If such use by any beneficiary at capacity output adversely
affects the utility received by any other, the design criteria result in
a project which is inappropriately sized relative to realizing the
benefits estimated for purposes of its design. 25 At any rate, it is
clear that design criteria as presently advanced relate to the correct
design for an irrelevant situation where reimbursement policies are
at variance with design criteria. If the agencies over-design the capacity of their facilities to avoid the predictable congestion, it represents a pragmatic adjustment involving additional (uneconomic)
capacity in a trade-off against congestion costs. Accordingly, in the
absence of a pricing policy consistent with efficiency criteria, either
an adulterated quality of service will be provided or a continuously
existing over-capacity will prevail. In the case of some kinds of
facilities, e.g., recreational, the providing of uneconomic capacity
for the inframarginal users may be dismissed perhaps with the
''merit wants" rationale. This, however, would be obviously specious in connection with waterway traffic, occupance of the flood
plain, use of the increased degradable capacity of streams, and other
intermediate goods provided without cost to users.
IV
THE VULNERABILITY OF VENERABILITY

This brings us finally to a consideration not related to public intervention per se, but rather to the efficiency with which the mechanism
24. The personnel of Electriciti de France represent a notable exception in this
regard. See J. R. Nelson, Marginal Cost Pricing (Prentice-Hall 1964).
25. Congestion costs, whether they be at lockage facilities on waterways or, say,
recreational facilities provided by the development, would have an effect equivalent
to shifting downward the marginal willingness to pay or benefit function for all supra
marginal beneficiaries. Whether or not the benefits aggregated over all infra marginal
beneficiaries are sufficient to compensate is not a priori determinate.
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of public intervention operates. Typically, a governmental agency is
established initially to carry out specific functions deemed desirable
in the public interest. In the course of its activities the agency defines
its role consistent with the functions it was established to discharge,
develops the means or capabilities appropriate to these particular
responsibilities, and in the process evolves a pattern of analysis and
action unique to its role as it is perceived. The more venerable
the agency the more traditional the perception of its role and the
means for performing its functions become, not only internally but
also as a reflection of its public image. But with the passage of time,
growth of the community, and changes in peripheral institutions
with which it deals, the functions which the agency has been created
to perform may recede in importance in the face of emerging new
circumstances outside the competence of its original character. The
legacy of traditional policy governing its behavior not only internal
to the agency, but also imposed from without to a certain extent,
restricts its capabilities to deal with the problems coming into dominance. The means of dealing with new situations is often restricted
to the reservoir of expertise developed over the years in its traditional role. An example is provided.
In the Eastern United States, emergence of water quality management as a matter of dominant concern is increasingly recognized.
Yet, despite the qualitatively different character of the problem, the
first major planning effort undertaken in this context, the Potomac
River Plan, bears a remarkable resemblance to the conventianal
Corps of Engineers plans. In this case we discover the traditional
emphasis on physical structures, but in this case for purposes of
augmenting low flows (of relatively rare occurrence but considerable severity) to dilute pollution concentrations. A very large part
of the problem to be dealt with is concentrated in the Potomac
estuary associated with the Washington metropolitan area's metropolitan area's sewage treatment plant outfalls. Assuring specified
flows for an increasingly higher proportion of the time requires
disproportional amounts of storage capacity which come at steeply
rising costs because of conflicting uses for the technically superior
reservoir sites. In this range of costs careful evaluation of the plan's
latter increments is required by reference to alternative technical
means or combinations of measures to achieve specified goals. Nevertheless, no detailed consideration was given alternatives such as
the more uniform distribution of the treatment plant's effluent
throughout the estuary to mitigate the concentration of biochemical
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oxygen demand, nor was consideration given to effluent oxygenation or other means of artificial reaeration or chemical treatment,
some of which are relatively low in capital costs and suitable for
dealing with occurrence of the rare event.
We may speculate as to the reasons for this. Typically, challenges are met with the aid of expertise within the responsible
agency, and it is not surprising that such expertise has been developed in response to meeting qualitatively different problems. Secondly, the Congress has not been very suggestible with respect to
providing the Corps of Engineers with resources to mount a program of research and investigation relevant to the new range of
problems which would support addition of staff with competence
qualitatively consistent with the new circumstances. There is periodic
static observed on Capitol Hill directed at suspected "duplication
and waste" in the area of water resources research in the federal
establishment. It does not require on overly perceptive agency head
to conclude that prospects remain slim for obtaining the support
to staff expanded facilities which are deemed by the Congress to
be esoteric to the agency's traditional functions. Finally, irrespective
of the problem posed by the foregoing considerations, there is little
disposition by any agency to consider seriously non-conventional
alternatives falling outside the scope of its own capabilities when
the institutional mechanism for introducing such measures is either
ill-defined or non-existent. There is a wholly understandable tendency
for the responsible agency to feel constrained to rely only on the
measures subject to its control. Given the permanence of reservoir
structures, and agencies with a highly developed capability for their
construction, the effect is to diminish seriously the prospects for
introduction of known alternative technology which at certain times
and under specified conditions will be superior to the measures
relied on.
CONCLUSION

These observations on the institutional machinery of public intervention at the present time merit serious consideration when the
question is posed with respect to the sufficiency of public intervention for the improvement of efficiency in the water resource development field. Perhaps the time has arrived when the greatest
dividend to study and experimentation would come in response to
a concerted effort to review the character and capabilities of exist-
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ing agencies, to identify the barriers to improved performance, and
to address the problem of organizing a capability consonant with
the requirements of the present and future. In such an evaluation
and assessment of alternative institutional arrangements, the centrality of reimbursement policy for improvement in efficiency would
need to be faced squarely with a recognition of the powerful influence which cost bearing by beneficiaries would have on the discriminating use of the entire range of cost reducing technological
alternatives. Not a little could be learned from the pioneering work
in water quality management by the cooperative water quality
management associations in the Ruhr, or the integration of investment planning, design criteria and pricing policy of Electricit6 de
France. Doubtless a similar spirit of innovation in the water resources field in the United States would add a considerable measure
of assurance that public intervention would be sufficient as well as
necessary to improvement of efficiency in water resource development programs.

